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1 
COMMENTS ON WHEN GOD ISN’T GREEN 
SARAH SCHINDLER 
Thank you for the opportunity to participate in the symposium and provide 
comments about Jay Wexler’s great new book, When God Isn’t Green. Given 
that Jay is both a humorist and a serious legal scholar with a penchant for taking 
trips, it should come as no surprise that this book reads like a mix between a 
travel guide, a humorous ethnography, and an adventure memoir. In addition to 
raising important questions about conflicts between two important, competing 
issues, Jay provides vivid imagery of his trips overseas. I especially appreciated 
the image of Jay sitting at a bar drinking with a cat. 
In this essay, I’d like to make three small points that struck me as I was 
reading the book. First, I’d like to situate the book within a larger body of 
scholarship about the cumulative impact of small harms. I’d then like to talk 
about how big (or small) the cumulative harms that he’s addressing in the book 
really are. I’ll conclude with a brief word on animal welfare. 
First, with respect to cumulative harms, a number of legal scholars have 
written about the fact that individuals, and their actions, cumulatively contribute 
to significant environmental harms.1 In the book, Jay provides many examples 
of religious practices that have negative effects on the environment. I view this 
book as falling within the literature addressing what are known as 
“environmentally significant individual behaviors.”2 The book fits well within 
the works of Katy Kuh, Jason Czarnezki, Jim Salzman, Mike Vandenbergh, 
Thaler & Sunstein and others on this point. 
The idea is that, if a single person is releasing a turtle into the wild, or lighting 
a bonfire, or cutting palm fronds, there likely wouldn’t be a problem (or a book), 
because any harm to the environment would be de minimis. The problem comes 
from the fact that large numbers of religious adherents engage in these practices. 
Thus, we can’t look at these actions individually. Rather, we have to look at 
them cumulatively, and when we do so, we might find that they impose harms 
that have a substantial negative impact on the environment. Although we 
historically have focused on large, industrial, point-source type polluters and 
pollutants, some scholars have begun to acknowledge that we must also focus 
on the actions of individuals that, when taken together, cause harm to the 
environment. 
 
 Professor of Law and Glassman Faculty Research Scholar, University of Maine School 
of Law. Thanks to Kellen Zale, Dmitry Bam, and Jason Czarnezki for helpful comments, and 
to Boston University for inviting me to participate in this symposium. 
1 See, e.g., Katrina Fischer Kuh, Environmental Privacy, 1 UTAH L. REV. 1, n.1 (2015). 
2 Id. at 1. 
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One important question that many of these scholars tackle is how to best 
regulate these individual actions in order to reduce the overall harm. My 
preferred framework for matching regulatory tool to harmful action is that set 
forth by Lawrence Lessig, wherein he discusses four forms of regulation, or 
constraints on behavior.3 These are laws or mandates, social norms, markets, and 
architecture. In the book, Jay touches on some of these regulatory options by 
referencing a variety of educational campaigns, bans on engaging in certain 
activities, and a number of architectural, or technical, solutions. I’ll discuss these 
shortly, but I want to first address the importance of the religious focus in Jay’s 
book. 
Here, I would like to ask Jay whether the religious practices that he describes 
in the book are more akin to norms or laws. Obviously, the answer to this 
question depends on the religion we are talking about, as well as the specific 
religious practice at issue and the beliefs of the adherents. But the answer to that 
question might help to inform the potential “solutions” to the problems that Jay 
raises in the book. This is because if a given practice is more like a norm, then 
an educational campaign—even one established by the government as opposed 
to the religion itself—might be successfully used to change it (although, 
religious norms are often sticky norms, and thus harder to change). But to the 
extent a practice is more akin to a law, it would likely need to be changed from 
inside the religion itself. 
In the book, Jay talks about some countries’ attempts at using laws or 
mandates to regulate harmful religious practices. But Jay recognizes that this 
probably isn’t the best approach, and I agree. He points out that laws often have 
unequal impacts. They might affect poor people more than wealthy ones, and 
thus might hinder the ability of poor people to express their religious beliefs 
more than rich.4 I would also add that using laws and mandates to control 
individual behavior is hard because they are difficult to enforce. Jay also notes 
that mandates tend to force practices underground. It is difficult to know what 
people are doing inside their homes, or in small groups, and thus it’s hard to stop 
them. It seems to me that, though acknowledging that no solution will be perfect, 
Jay is suggesting that architectural solutions might be the best approach for 
regulating environmentally harmful religious practices. He says, “finding a 
technology-based approach will usually be preferable to outright bans.”5 
Technology-based approaches are akin to what Lessig refers to as regulation 
through architecture. When Lessig talks about architecture as a form of 
 
3 Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 662-63 (1998). 
4 “[T]he government should be very wary of implementing any regulation meant to protect 
the environment that will allow some believers to practice their religion but not others.” JAY 
WEXLER, WHEN GOD ISN’T GREEN 102 (2016). Of course, some might argue that this is true 
of any neutral law that prohibits certain conduct, and if society has determined that the conduct 
is harmful enough to prohibit it, perhaps it shouldn’t matter that some people are affected 
more than others. 
5 Id. at 139. 
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regulation, he uses the word quite broadly in reference to “the physical world as 
we find it, even if ‘as we find it’ is simply how it has already been made.”6 The 
idea is that that physical features of the built environment constrain our behavior. 
Jay’s book provides a number of examples of architectural solutions to the 
harmful religious practices that are discussed. These include: 
 Building eco-friendly artificial pools in which to immerse Ganesha 
idols as a substitute for submerging them in the ocean; 
 Promoting the use of natural dyes for use during Holi festival in India 
instead of chemical ones; 
 Developing green, environmentally-friendly temples and smoke-free 
furnaces for burning joss paper in Asia. 
While these ideas can help to reduce some of the environmental harms 
associated with certain religious practices, there are concerns with these types 
of architectural solutions as well. First, do they result in religious practices that 
are too sterile, stripped of their vibrancy? And if so, is there a risk that people 
will feel like they can’t effectively practice their religion? Or perhaps they will 
seek ways to get around the architectural constraints instead. 
Second, architectural regulation typically modifies the built environment, and 
once constructed, features of the built environment are enduring and hard to 
change. Therefore, if a number of green temples,7 artificial pools, and smoke-
free furnaces are built, but no one is using them, we’re stuck with them until we 
tear them down. This, of course, is costly, and results in waste that has to be 
disposed of. 
And finally, perhaps the greatest concern with architectural forms of 
regulation is that, when we seek to change behavior through architecture, it can 
backfire. This is because an individual’s behavior can change in ways that we 
don’t necessarily expect. This phenomenon is sometimes described as the 
“rebound effect.”8 For example, a landlord may install low-flow showerheads to 
reduce water usage, but her tenants might just take longer showers.9 Thus, 
behavior can counteract the environmental benefits of the architectural solution. 
So, we should consider how behaviors might change in the context of religious 
practices before installing permanent, expensive architectural fixes to address 
these harms. 
 
6 Lawrence Lessig, Commentary, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 
113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 507 (1999). 
7 Jay noted that one of the green temples he visited seemed to be underused. 
8 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Sustainable Consumption, Energy Policy, and Individual 
Well-Being, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1479, 1521 (2012) (“[W]hen energy use is more efficient, 
consumers may increase some of their energy-using activities. For instance, if lighting is very 
energy efficient, consumers may be less careful about turning off lights in vacant rooms. Or 
they may simply use more lights in order to have a brighter room, negating the energy savings 
from the more efficient lighting.”). 
9 P.W. Mayer, et al., Residential End Uses of Water, American Waterworks Association 
Research Foundation, Denver, CO (1998). 
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The second broad issue I want to raise is really a question, which is: 
cumulatively, how significant of a contributor to environmental harms are these 
religious practices? In the book, Jay states, “when faced with a substantial risk 
to the environment and human health, the government has an obligation to 
regulate activities to protect its citizens, regardless of the religious motivation of 
the activity.”10 So, are the risks that he addresses in the book in fact 
“substantial,” and how do we make that determination? 
For example, Jay addresses the fact that mercury is used in religious 
ceremonies inside some homes. However, “common household products and 
toiletries make up approximately 15 percent of the total mercury found in 
domestic wastewater.”11 Does the mercury used in religious rituals make up a 
greater or smaller percentage? Similarly, I was interested to read about the palms 
used in Palm Sunday, but what about palm trees that are destroyed for non-
religious uses, such as oil, and for hearts of palm? Perhaps those activities are 
contributing more to the destruction of palm trees and habitats than the religious 
practice—and isn’t that relevant when we’re talking about where to focus our 
regulatory power? 
This doesn’t mean that the religious practices are necessarily insignificant or 
unsubstantial, but it does raise questions, including how significant or 
substantial they are, how we determine what constitutes a “significant” impact 
on the environment, and how we determine where to target our limited 
regulatory resources. It seems to me that we must be concerned not only with 
determining the most appropriate regulatory tool to control harmful practices, 
but also with targeting the most significant behaviors. With respect to the 
burning of Joss paper, Jay says that it is “hardly the biggest contributor to air 
pollution in the region, but this detail is beside the point.”12 Perhaps it need not 
be the biggest contributor, but surely at some point the impact—even the 
cumulative impact—is so small as to make it de minimus. So where is that line? 
And do we need that type of empirical research before we decide whether and 
how to regulate these practices? 
The final point I want to mention, briefly, concerns the animal-related 
practices that Jay describes in the book. As a professor of animal law and a long-
time vegan, I have some concluding thoughts here. There are many examples in 
our laws where necessity justifies an action that would otherwise be 
impermissible. Similarly, the exact same act could be legal if done for purposes 
of ritual slaughter or for food consumption, but illegal if done for fun. This focus 
 
10 WEXLER, supra note 4, at 139 (emphasis added). 
11 Michael P. Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV: The Individual as Regulated Entity 
in the New Era of Environmental Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 515, 563 (2004) (“Other 
contributions identified in the AMSA study include infiltration and inflow into the sewer 
system, mercury used in religious rituals and folk medicine, and the use of thimerisol, a 
preservative, in some vaccines.”) (emphasis added). 
12 WEXLER, supra note 4, at 139. 
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on the justification rather than the act itself is also something to consider in the 
context of Jay’s book. 
The book details the practice of mercy release, where people will gather or 
purchase large numbers of animals and then release them into the wild, 
sometimes into inappropriate habitats. The book also notes that many of the 
mercy release animals die in transport. It details the way that birds are kept in 
tiny cages, and the way that these releases often harm existing ecosystems. We 
come away with the sense that this is a very bad practice, especially when 
undertaken on a large scale. Let’s assume that, on a large scale, these harms are 
significant. Some might suggest that the practice should be regulated, despite 
the fact that we view religion as a core fundamental liberty.13 Is that because 
those people devalue religion? Or because the harm to the animals and the 
environment outweighs the importance of religion? 
Here, I would like to analogize to animals that are raised for food in the United 
States. They too are regularly kept in too-small enclosures in facilities that harm 
the environment. And yet these practices are allowed to continue. Even if a 
religious practice and a food-production practice result in precisely the same 
significant harm to the environment, people will likely consider those practices 
differently depending on the justification, as well as their own worldview. 
Although the use of animals for food goes beyond the scope of Jay’s book, I 
believe this comparison gets at a fundamental question the book wants us to 
consider: how does a person “rank” these justifications? Why might a person 
believe that religion doesn’t justify a certain harm to an animal, but consumption 
for food does? Is eating animals more or less of a necessity than using them for 
religious practices? And, should we care at all about the reason for the harm, or 
should we just look at the harm itself? These are big questions, and I’m glad that 
Jay’s book provides us with a vehicle to foster these discussions. 
 
13 There is obviously a tension in the law between the importance of religious liberty 
(indeed, we sometimes give exemptions to religious groups for what society has deemed to 
be harmful conduct) and the importance of the government remaining neutral on religion 
when protecting society from harm (see, e.g., Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)). 
